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Abstract
Since Henry George (1839-1897) economists have been arguing that a tax on unim-
proved land is an ideal tax on e¢ ciency grounds. Output taxes, on the other hand,
have distortional e⁄ects on the economy. This paper shows that under asymmetric
information output tax might be used along with land tax in order to implement
the optimal taxation scheme in a Latin-American context, i.e., in an economy with
imperfect land-rental market, non-agricultural land use and non-revenue objectives
of land taxation. Also, we show that: (i) schemes based on land taxes alone might
not be implementable; and (ii) tax evasion is more acute among large landholders.
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Taxes on land are among the oldest forms of taxation. Arnott and Stiglitz
(1979), extending the so-called Henry George theorem, demonstrate that a
tax on land rents is not only e¢ cient, but the sole tax instrument necessary
to ￿nance a pure public good in large economies where the di⁄erential land
rents are well de￿ned and the distribution of economic activity over space is
Pareto-optimal. On the other hand, land taxation is one of the few cases of
lump-sum tax, being based on assets rather than on agricultural production.
However, while land taxation enjoys striking advantages from a theoretical
point of view, it is hardly ever used in developing countries. Trying to explain
this fact, Skinner (1991) indicates two major drawbacks of land taxes relative
to output taxes - they increase risk borne by farmers as well as entailing high
administrative costs. Ho⁄(1991) points to the use of a mix of land and output
taxes as an attempt to mitigate the adverse e⁄ect of a pure land-taxation
regime in an economy with imperfect insurance markets.
In this paper, the mix of land and output taxes arises as the optimal taxation
instrument in an economy where farmer￿ s ability, and therefore land use, is
private information. We show that the problem of informational costs raised by
Skinner (1991) can be at least partially resolved in a typical Latin-American
country by using an output tax as a part of the tax mechanism. This additional
component takes advantage of the fact that the information about agricultural
output is more reliable than self-reported indicators of productivity.
Many countries in Latin America have attempted to implement progressive
land taxes in order to induce large landholders to use their land more in-
tensively rather than to ￿nance local government. Progressive tax rates are
treated as a means of dissuading land speculation, inducing large landowners
to sell out or use land more intensively. Implementation of this instrument has
been disappointing - farmers often ￿nd ways around such taxes [Binswanger,
Deininger and Feder (1995), Deininger and Feder (2000) and Bird and Slack
(2002)]. In Brazil, for example, the enactment of the Land Statute in 1964
imposed non-revenue functions on land taxation, which became involved on
the job of assisting public land-redistribution policies [Oliveira (1993)]. Since
then, the land-tax mechanism has aimed at imposing penalties on unimproved
land. Nevertheless, the original objectives of the tax were not achieved. Land
taxes in Brazil have never constituted a good source of revenue and further,
have hardly managed to achieve any of the desired changes in the rural envi-
ronment.
Land ownership in Latin America can be used for agricultural production or
for other non-agricultural purposes. Land is used not only as a productive
asset but also as a source of other bene￿ts - ￿as a hedge against in￿ation, as
2an asset that can be liquidated to smooth consumption in the face of risk, as
collateral for access to loans, as a tax shelter, or as a means of laundering
illicit funds￿[De Janvry, Key and Sadoulet (1997)]. Therefore, we consider a
continuum of types of producers who are di⁄erentiated by their proclivity for
non-agricultural activity and agricultural productivity. Each type of producer
constitutes private information and the area under cultivation is not observed.
Land-rental markets in Latin America are underdeveloped. Typically only 5
to 10% of the land is rented out, which is remarkably low when compared
to United States or European patterns. A large body of literature has been
theoretically addressing the reasons for the imperfections in the land-rental
market. 1 Many reasons provide explanations for a reduction in the share of
output appropriated by the tenants. Speci￿cally, one factor that is likely to be
important in most Latin American countries is the landlord￿ s fear of loss of the
land [Macours, De Janvry and Sadoulet (2001)]. In the absence of a land rental
market, farmers with low agricultural productivity cannot use their titles to
obtain non-agricultural gains and also lease out their land to other farmers
for agricultural production. The only option for them is to retain a portion of
their tracts in the form of idle land. Although farmers with low agricultural
productivity choose farm size and cultivated area separately, those with high
agricultural productivity and low non-agricultural yields choose only the farm
size, since they are constrained by the no-rental-market constraint. The no-
rental-market constraint determines two groups of farmers: those who face a
one-dimensional problem of maximization and those who have two di⁄erent
choices (farm size and cultivated area).
Summarily, we study the problem of optimal taxation in an economy where
(i) there are non-revenue objectives of land taxation; (ii) land provides both
agricultural and non-agricultural payo⁄s; and (iii) the land rental market is im-
perfect. The main result is that relying solely on land tax is optimal only when
the social-planner information about farmers is complete or when farmers do
not hold unimproved land; otherwise, the optimal scheme is a linear combi-
nation of output and land taxes. Under additional assumptions regarding the
relationship between the agricultural and non-agricultural productivities for
di⁄erent farmers, we show that a tax mechanism based solely on land taxes
can be implemented for small farms because they have no idle land. This is
consistent with the Brazilian experience with land taxation, where the di¢ -
culty of accurately appraising the extent of area utilized has determined a high
rate of evasion and under-reporting, especially among large landholdings.
1 The basic arguments are: risk sharing [Cheung (1969)], hidden actions and moral
hazard [Stiglitz (1974); Ghatak and Pandey (2000); Eswaran and Kotwal (1985)],
screening [Hallagan (1978) and Allen (1982)] and limited liability constraints [Shetty
(1988); La⁄ont and Matoussi (1995)].
3This paper attempts to ￿ll a gap between optimal taxation models under
asymmetric information, in the tradition initiated by Mirrlees (1971), and
the land-taxation models mentioned above. The mechanics of our model is
quite similar to that of Stern (1982). Asymmetric information about farmers
introduces a role for output taxes, even considering their distortional e⁄ect.
The mix of output and land taxes arises as a solution for the typical trade-o⁄
between rent extraction and distortion commonly observed in adverse-selection
models.
The plan of the paper is as follows. Section 2 introduces and analyzes the
basic model. In Section 3 we link tax evasion to farm size using an additional
assumption about the ordering of farmer types and present, as an example, the
Brazilian experience with land taxation. The discussion about the assumptions
adopted, the generality of the results and implications for public policies are
made in Section 4. Concluding comments are o⁄ered in Section 5.
2 The Model
The analysis is carried out in a partial-equilibrium environment. The price
obtained for agricultural output is normalized at 1, an unlimited quantity of
land is available at price p and each harvested hectare costs w. For the sake
of simpli￿cation, we assume that labor and other inputs are used in ￿xed
proportions with land at a cost w per hectare. Both production and land are
perfectly homogeneous.





distributed according to the distribution function F and positive density f.
The parameter ￿ re￿ ects the technology available for each farmer, indicating
the revenues obtained from agricultural and non-agricultural land use.
Land in our framework is not only an agricultural input but an asset that
provides non-agricultural payo⁄s to its owners. This is a key feature of land
markets in Latin America which is introduced in our model. As pointed out by
Berry and Cline (1979), ￿in countries with poorly developed capital markets,
especially those with chronic in￿ ation, landowners may ￿nd it attractive to
hold land for speculative gain - or merely to accomplish the store of value
objective￿ . Land ownership is also a source of market power (Conning, 2001)
or political pressure in countries without secret ballots (Baland and Robinson,
2004). In summary, we assume one of the many reasons that generate a wedge
between the land price and the discounted expected value of income streams
from agricultural production. 2 Therefore, a farmer of type ￿ who holds T
2 See Deininger and Feder (2000) for a survey.
4hectares of land, grows A and pays a transfer t to the social planner, obtains
pro￿ts given by:
￿ = Q(A;￿) + ￿(T;￿) ￿ wA ￿ pT ￿ t; (1)
where Q and ￿ are respectively the agricultural and non-agricultural produc-
tion functions with QA > 0 > QAA, ￿T > 0 > ￿TT, QA (0;￿) = ￿T (0;￿) = 1
and QA (1;￿) = ￿T (1;￿) = 0, i.e., both functions are subject to decreasing
marginal returns and Inada￿ s conditions. 3 The function ￿ is a reduced-form
representation of non-agricultural payo⁄s of landholding. We assume these ad-
ditional gains are not in￿ uenced by the cultivated area A and are determined
exclusively by the farm size T.
Peasant are ordered such that the parameter ￿ is positively related to the
marginal non-agricultural bene￿ts of landholding. The e⁄ect of ￿ on Q is
considered later. Initially, it can be positive or negative. In order to simplify the
analysis, we assume ￿ a⁄ects Q and ￿ linearly. 4 These preliminary functional-
form hypotheses are summarized as:
Assumption A1 (ordering and linearity of ￿): ￿T￿ (￿;￿) > 0 and Q￿￿ (￿;￿) =
￿￿￿ (￿;￿) = 0 for every ￿ 2 ￿.
We assume there is no rental market and hence the choice of each producer
must respect the condition A ￿ T. Thus, based on a taxation scheme t, farmers
are faced with the program:
max
A;T ￿ s.t. A ￿ T: (P)
Individuals decide to participate whenever ￿ ￿ 0.
Finally, we consider a social planner that mimic the e⁄ort of some Latin
American governments, maximizing the tax revenue and hindering the non-
agricultural motive of landholding. 5 Policy-makers from these countries have
been attempting (without success) to use land taxes as an instrument of land
redistribution. Thus, we study the problem of a social planner with utility
3 Notice that our analysis is carried out in a current approach, where A and T
are modelled as ￿ ow variables. Since we are primarily interested in land use, this
approach does not have major consequences and substantially simpli￿es the analysis.
4 This condition avoids some assumptions regarding third derivatives which gener-
ally have little economic insight.
5 See Binswanger, Deininger and Feder (1995), Deininger and Feder (2000) and
Bird and Slack (2002).
5function de￿ned by 6
U = t ￿ ￿￿(T;￿); (2)
where ￿ 2 [0;1] is the social cost attributed to the non-agricultural use of
land.
2.1 The ￿rst-best case
Initially, we consider the design of a tax mechanism in an environment of
complete information, i.e., we assume the social planner can exactly observe
the type of agents and manages to establish tax-collection rules that inter-
nalize precisely the willingness of each producer to use land for agricultural
production or not.
Under complete information, the social planner can determine the allocations
for each producer via a punitive taxation scheme. The choice of the tax scheme
is restricted only by the participation constraint (IR) and the absence of a land-
rental market (RM). The ￿rst-best program in this case de￿nes the optimal




￿ ￿ 0; (IR)
A ￿ T: (RM)
First, note that (IR) is binding. 7 Therefore, the transfers required by the
optimal tax scheme represent all the producer￿ s pro￿ts.
Substituting (IR), the solution of (P.FB) is given by the following system of
equations: 8
QA (A
￿;￿) = w + ￿
￿; (3a)
(1 ￿ ￿)￿T (T












6 Section 4 provides some discussion on the social planner￿ s objective function.
This particular functional form is useful to produce pure land taxes as the ￿rst-best
solution. More general forms could determine that the pure land tax mechanisms,
which are widespread in Latin America, were be no longer ￿rst-best optimal.
7 Otherwise, the social planner could reach a higher level of U increasing t mar-
ginally, without violating (IR) or (RM).
8 Hereafter, in order to facilitate notation, we drop the dependence on ￿, i.e., we
write ￿￿ (￿) as ￿￿, A￿ (￿) as A￿, T￿ (￿) as T￿, and so on.
6where ￿￿ is the Lagrangian multiplier corresponding to the no-rental-market
constraint (RM).
De￿ne ￿C = f￿ 2 ￿ : ￿￿ > 0g and its complement ￿U = ￿ ￿ ￿C. While
farmers in ￿C (constrained farmers) harvest all land they have, those in ￿U
(unconstrained farmers) hold some amount of idle land.
When ￿ = 0, the social planner is not bothered by the non-agricultural use of
land, and the choices of A and T are not a⁄ected by the tax mechanism. In
this case, equations (3a) and (3b) become the ￿rst-order conditions of farmer￿ s
best choice of A and T. If ￿ = 1, equation (3b) determines that ￿C = ￿, i.e.,
there is no idle land in the optimal taxation scheme. The shadow price of the
rental-market constraint in the latter case becomes constant and equal to the
price of land for all ￿ 2 ￿. Therefore, ￿ actually represents the e⁄ort of the
social planner to hinder non-agricultural land use.
As a consequence, there is a threshold ￿ ￿ < 1 such that every economy with
￿ < ￿ ￿ has some pieces of idle land in the ￿rst-best solution. Since we are
primarily focused in such economies, we will restrict the analysis to the cases
where ￿ < ￿ ￿ as pointed by the following assumption.
Assumption A2: ￿ < ￿ ￿, where ￿ ￿ is implicitly de￿ned by ￿ ￿ = 1￿
p
￿T(T￿(￿ ￿);￿ ￿).
The following result shows that the optimal tax scheme under complete infor-
mation can be implemented by pure land taxes.
Proposition 1 The solution to the optimal-taxation problem (P.FB) can be





￿ = ￿￿T (T ￿;￿) = ￿
1￿￿ (p ￿ ￿￿) and ￿￿ = t￿ ￿ ￿
￿T ￿.
PROOF. Consider t = ￿
￿T +￿￿, where ￿
￿ and ￿￿ are de￿ned as above. The
￿rst-order conditions for (P) can be written as:
QA (A;￿) = w + ￿;
￿T (T;￿) = p + ￿
￿ ￿ ￿;
￿(T ￿ A) = 0:
Using the de￿nition of ￿
￿ it is easy to check that the system above is equivalent
to the system (3). The value of ￿￿ adjusts the level of the transfers in order
to satisfy (IR) with equality.￿
7Proposition 1 shows that the social planner can implement the optimal tax
scheme under complete information o⁄ering a pair (￿
￿;￿￿) to the producer of
type ￿. Solving (P), each farmer chooses the amounts of A and T determined
by the solution of (P.FB). The land-tax rate is equal to the social cost of
non-agricultural landholding which is increasing with respect to ￿. If ￿ = 0,
the government does not distort the choice of the farm size by not taxing the
ownership of land (￿
￿ = 0). If ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿, on the other hand, there is no idle land
after taxation (￿C = ￿).
Observe that in ￿U we get a ￿ at rate ￿
￿ = ￿
1￿￿p which does not vary ac-
cording to the type of producer. Thus, the model shows that in a context of
complete information, one may use a single rate for all producers operating
with unimproved land.
In short, if the social planner could precisely observe landowner-productivity
parameters, there is a pure land-tax scheme capable of implementing the opti-
mal taxation schedule. In this solution, if ￿ > 0, the social planner discourages
the non-agricultural use of land, and with ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿, there would be no idle land
in equilibrium.
2.2 The second-best case
Consider now a more realistic case in which ￿ is private information. The
choice of the optimal taxation scheme becomes a typical mechanism-design
problem. The revelation principle ensures it is su¢ cient to concentrate on a
direct mechanism that induces truthful revelation of the farmer￿ s productivity
parameter (see Mirrlees, 1971). Each mechanism is an allocation determined
by a set of three functions (t;A;T) de￿ned on ￿ and should be interpreted as
the principal collecting a tax t in exchange for a choice (A;T). 9
Let ￿(^ ￿j￿) the payo⁄ of a producer of type ￿ who declares to be type ^ ￿, i.e.,








￿ w ^ A ￿ p^ T ￿ ^ t;












. The truth-telling requirement
establishes a restriction on the set of all feasible mechanisms which can be
summarized in the following de￿nition.
De￿nition An allocation (t;A;T) is implementable (or incentive compatible)
9 The fact that QA > 0 implies that it is equivalent to designing a mechanism in
terms of either (t;A;T) or (t;Q;T). This choice is a matter of convenience. For more
details, see the proof of proposition 5 in appendix.
8if and only if
￿(￿j￿) ￿ ￿(^ ￿j￿); 8 ￿;^ ￿ 2 ￿. (IC)
Every implementable allocation is such that the agent is interested in revealing
his correct type rather than untruthfully declaring himself to be of some other
type. The next result establishes a more tractable form for implementable
allocations based on Guesnerie and La⁄ont (1984).




￿(￿j￿) = Q￿ (A;￿) + ￿￿ (T;￿); (IC1)
and
QA￿ (A;￿) _ A + ￿T￿ (T;￿) _ T ￿ 0; almost surely in ￿. (IC2)
This and all the proofs of the results that follow are in the appendix.
We know that the local ￿rst- and second-order conditions (IC1) and (IC2) of
incentive compatibility are in general only necessary. Our strategy, therefore,
is to de￿ne and characterize the solution of the relaxed mechanism design
program for this problem, i.e., the one with these local conditions in the place
of the incentive compatibility constraint. 10






[t ￿ ￿￿(T;￿)]f (￿)d￿ (P:SB)
subject to (IC),
￿(￿j￿) ￿ 0; (IR￿)
and
A ￿ T: (RM￿)
Analogously, we de￿ne (P:SBR) as the relaxed version of (P:SB), where we
replace (IC) by its ￿rst-order condition. We will follow the ￿rst-order approach
to (P:SB), examining later the conditions for which the solution of (P:SBR)
and (P:SB) coincide.
10 We will show, in the proposition that follows, that these local conditions are
su¢ cient for implementability under monotonicity of the mechanism and the single
crossing property.
9In order to solve the program above using the standard techniques, we need
a condition of sorting regarding the e⁄ect of ￿ on Q and ￿.
Assumption A3: Q￿ (￿;￿) + ￿￿ (￿;￿) > 0 for every ￿ 2 ￿.
Assumption (A3) establishes that, holding the farm size ￿xed for no idle land,
farmers with higher values of ￿ can obtain a larger payo⁄. Under (A3), condi-
tions (RM￿) and (IC1) imply (IR￿) is binding only for ￿ = ￿. Otherwise, the
social planner could improve by increasing t without violating the constraints.







subject to (IR￿) and (RM￿), where
￿(A;T;￿) ￿ Q(A;￿) ￿ wA + (1 ￿ ￿)￿(T;￿) ￿ pT
￿R(￿)(Q￿ (A;￿) + ￿￿ (T;￿))
and R(￿) ￿
1￿F(￿)
f(￿) . 11 We make the following assumption to assure that the
use the ￿rst-order conditions for the maximization program above is su¢ cient.
Assumption A4: QAA (￿;￿) ￿ R(￿)QAA￿ (￿;￿) < 0 and (1 ￿ ￿)￿TT (￿;￿) ￿
R(￿)￿TT￿ (￿;￿) < 0, for each ￿ 2 ￿.
This implies that ￿(A;T;￿) is strictly concave in (A;T) and, by Inada￿ s con-
dition, it has a unique maximum for each ￿ 2 ￿. The ￿rst-order conditions of












￿￿) = 0: (4c)






















11 Notice that ￿AT = 0.
10obtained from the integration of (IC1). If (IC) is veri￿ed for every pair
(A￿￿;T ￿￿) in ￿, the solution of (P:SB) is completely de￿ned by the system
(4) and (5), under (A4). We assure this is the case by imposing the next two
assumptions.
Assumption A5: (Strong monotonic hazard-rate condition) _ R(￿) ￿ ￿￿ for
all ￿ 2 ￿.
Assumption A6: QA￿ (￿;￿) + (1 ￿ ￿)￿T￿ (￿;￿) ￿ 0 for every ￿ 2 ￿.
Assumptions (A5) and (A6) are used to avoid the need of the ￿ironing prin-
ciple￿ in the solution. Condition (A5) is satis￿ed for distributions such as
uniform. 12 Assumption (A6) is another sorting condition establishing that a
marginal increase in ￿ determines an increase on the total revenue from land-
holding, even if QA￿ < 0. Notice that the sign of QA￿ is not de￿ned. The next
result shows that (A1)-(A6) are su¢ cient to characterize (4) as the unique
solution for (P:SB).
Proposition 3 Suppose that (A1)-(A6) are satis￿ed. Then the solution of
(P:SB) is determined by the system (4) along with the de￿nition of t￿￿.
The result above shows that the best direct revelation tax mechanism is given
by the triple (t￿￿;A￿￿;T ￿￿). Under this mechanism, each farmer is induced to
announce that his type is the true ￿ receiving the allocation (A￿￿;T ￿￿) and
paying t￿￿. However, there are more reasonable mechanisms which yield the
same results derived above. The implementation of the optimal solution via
a menu of linear taxes is presented in the next proposition. Similarly to the
￿rst-best case, let ~ ￿C = f￿ 2 ￿ : ￿￿￿ > 0g and ~ ￿U = ￿ ￿ ~ ￿C.
In order to implement the optimal solution via a menu of linear taxes, we need
additional properties involving QAA￿ and ￿TT￿. A su¢ cient condition is given
by the following assumption.
Assumption A7: QAA￿ (￿;￿) ￿ 0 and ￿TT￿ ￿ 0 for every ￿ 2 ￿. 13
12 Actually, in order to assure that system (4) determines the optimal solution for
(P:SBR), we need only that _ R(￿) ￿ 0. However, this stronger version is necessary
to the implementation result.
13 Notice that assumptions (A4) and (A7) determine that:
(1 ￿ ￿)￿TT (￿;￿) ￿ R(￿)￿TT￿ (￿;￿) < 0 ￿ ￿￿TT￿ (￿;￿);
which is perfectly consistent under (A2).
11Now, our main result can be presented.
Proposition 4 Under (A1)-(A7), the solution of (P:SB) can be decentralized
by a menu of linear taxes through the following: (i) the social planner o⁄ers
a menu of linear taxes based on the observable variables T (farm size) and
Q (agricultural output) and the announcement of the farmer￿ s productivity
parameter ^ ￿ given by
t(Q;T;^ ￿) = ￿(^ ￿)Q + ￿(^ ￿)T + ￿(^ ￿);
(ii) based on the tax schedule t(Q;T;^ ￿), farmers of each type choose Q and





. The tax schedule is such that ￿(^ ￿) = 0 for every ^ ￿ 2 ￿C.
The total tax is constituted by a three-part tari⁄: an output tax, a land tax
and a ￿xed part. Observe that the scheme put forward as a solution for the
model with complete information cannot be implemented under asymmetric
information, i.e., it is not possible to implement the optimal tax mechanism
relying only on land taxes. From Proposition 4, it is necessary to use output
taxes along with land taxes in order to obtain the optimal allocation to farmers
with idle land. Notice that the ￿xed part does not alter the choices of the
cultivated area A and farm size T and it is used only to extract rent from the
farmers.
3 Farm Size and Tax Evasion
This section examines some implications of the previous analysis for land
taxation in Latin American countries, exploring the contents of Proposition 4.
Despite the absence of a land rental market, there is a consensus regarding the
existence of a dualism in agrarian organization in Latin America. Small farmers
with high yields per hectare coexist with less productive large landholders. We
adopt the next assumption to concentrate our analysis on this Latin American
situation.
Assumption A8: QA￿ (￿;￿) < 0 for every ￿ 2 ￿.
Under (A6) and (A8), the types of farmers are such that a higher ￿ refers to
an increase in the non-agricultural land bene￿ts and a decrease in the agri-
cultural productivity of land. Farmers with high ￿ obtain pro￿ts mostly from
non-agricultural land use, experiencing lower agricultural productivity. As a
consequence, those farmers are expected to have larger tracts with a smaller
12cropped area. In other words, assumptions (A1) and (A8) are su¢ cient to
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Fig. 1. Optimal allocations in the ￿rst-best (black) and second-best (gray) cases
Lemma 5 Assume (A1)-(A8). There exists at most one critical type ~ ￿ 2 ￿
such that ~ ￿C = [￿;~ ￿] and ~ ￿U = (~ ￿;￿ ￿]. Also, _ T ￿￿ = _ A￿￿ > 0 for all farmers in
~ ￿C, _ T ￿￿ > 0 and _ A￿￿ < 0 for all farmers in ~ ￿U.
Lemma 5 has two important consequences. First, all types can be completely
described by the farm size - formally, T ￿￿ is an one-to-one function. Second,




) are restricted by the rental-
market constraint. It is also straightforward to obtain a similar result from
(A8) to the complete information case. Figure 1 compares the ￿rst-best and
second-best allocations.
Assumption (A8), through Lemma 5, provides an easier interpretation for
the contents of Proposition 4. The output tax rate should be zero for small
farmers who are restricted by the absence of a land rental market, operating
without idle land (see Figure 2). Even though the tax on output causes a
distortion in resource allocation, its use is justi￿ed by its ability to compose
an implementable (or self-revealing) taxation mechanism, especially for large
landholders. Therefore, the tax evasion tends to be more acute for these large
farmers in countries with pure land tax instruments. The next proposition
summarizes these ￿ndings.
14 This inverse relationship between farm size and productivity can be theoreti-
cally explained either by interaction of di⁄erent market imperfections (Feder, 1985;
Eswaran and Kotwal, 1986) or by a self-selection argument (Assun￿ªo and Ghatak,
2003). The empirical evidence is vast, including; for example, Berry and Cline
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Fig. 2. Optimal rates: taxes on output (black) and land (gray).
Proposition 6 Under (A1)-(A8), the optimal land-taxation problem is such
that: (i) there is evasion when a pure land tax regime is used and ￿U 6= ?;






An example: the Brazilian experience
Land tax (Rural Property Tax - ITR) in Brazil, since its creation through
the Land Statute of 1964, has been used to support public policies for land
redistribution. Nevertheless, there is a high level of evasion and default that
hinders its e¢ ciency as an instrument of landholding policy. Two large-scale
reforms of ITR were carried out, in 1979 and 1996, but the results have not
su¢ ced to overcome the associated problems. According to the current scheme,
the rate would vary from 0.03% to 20% of the land value. The rates di⁄er
only by degree of utilization and total area, being sharply progressive rates
in relation to the farm size and regressive with respect to the percentage of
cropped area, so that productive properties are bene￿ted.
In an economy such as Brazil￿ s, where producers operate with idle land and
the government is often in the dark as to the true productivity parameters
of the agricultural and non-agricultural activities available to various land-
holders, Proposition 4 shows that there are no tax rates able to make ITR an
optimal taxation scheme. The use of an output tax becomes necessary so that
producers with better access to non-agricultural activities will pay their share
of the tax burden.
A natural way to implement this result, using the pre-existent and well-de￿ned
structure of the output tax (which is called ICMS in Brazil), is to consider
the tax rate a function of the farm size and the total output tax collected
14per hectare. The degree of use, which is a non-observable variable, should be
replaced by the amount of ICMS collected per hectare. This implementation
has a great potential to improve not only the application of ITR but also the
collection of ICMS. The scheme proposed implies an additional cost to the
evasion and default of ICMS given by the increase in the ITR. Therefore, this
reformulation constitutes a new step towards more reliable tax institutions.
Note that only the information about the ICMS is required in this scheme.
Hence, there is no need for large modi￿cations in the existent institutions and
mechanisms.
This inability to implement ITR as a solution to the problem with asymmet-
ric information lends theoretical support to what the government found by
comparing declared against actual data. According to the Presidential Press
O¢ ce, the percentage of value declared in relation to real value in the 1980s
varied from 20% for properties of less than 10 hectares down to as low as
1.2% for large properties of over 10 thousand hectares. The area reported as
usable was also far short of the true ￿gure, with large landowners declaring
around 50% and small ones 94% of the real measure. This casual evidence is
compatible not only with the inadequacy of a pure land-tax regime but also
with the fact that small producers, in general with no idle land, are more likely
to declare their land use correctly. The Brazilian case shows not only that a
pure scheme based on land taxes is not implementable but also that evasion
is more accentuated among large landholders.
4 Discussion
We have used a model to study an optimal land-taxation problem in the
context of a typical Latin American country. In this section, we describe the
role of each key ingredient in our main results.
Some authors recognize that a tax on land has both ￿scal and non-￿scal e⁄ects.
Although it can be an important source to ￿nance local governments, it must
also be considered from a more general policy perspective. Land taxes can be
an alternative to traditional con￿scatory land-reform programs. Land taxes
might provide an incentive for greater density and better use of land. Based
on this literature, our analysis has also considered non-revenue objectives for
land taxation. 15
In a more general scenario, we could consider the social planner￿ s utility func-
tion as U (t;A;T) = t ￿   (A;T), where   is strictly decreasing in A and
15 E.g. Binswanger, Deininger and Feder (1995), Deininger and Feder (2000), Bird
and Slack (2002).
15increasing in T. In other words, the social planner could promote agricultural
production and avoid large landholdings. 16 In this case, it is straightforward
to check that the use of output tax is always required in a linear implemen-
tation of the optimal taxation scheme, even in the complete information case.
Therefore, relying only on land tax would not be optimal even if the produc-
tivity parameter were publicly observed.
On the other hand, the utility function we have used provides a meaningful
benchmark. It allows us to analyze the need of output taxes as part of the
optimal tax mechanism. A comparison between Proposition 1 and Proposition
4 reveals that asymmetric information may lead the need of output taxes along
with land taxes in order to control both cultivated area and farm size.
Another key feature of our analysis is the non-agricultural component of land
demand. As mentioned before, many reasons have contributed to distort the
allocation of land in favor of large landholders, especially in Latin American
countries. In terms of the model, this is represented by the function ￿(T;￿),
which is essential for our analysis. If ￿(T;￿) = 0 for all T and ￿, no idle land
would exist in equilibrium. In this case, all farmers exploit the full agricultural
capacity of their holdings, keeping A = T. Therefore, ￿U = ~ ￿U = ? and the
optimal tax mechanism can be implemented using only the tax on land in
both cases - complete or incomplete information. The output tax is required
only when there is a separation between the choice of cultivated area and farm
size.
Finally, we have assumed that the land rental market is absent. Alternatively,
we could consider an imperfect land rental market. In this case, we believe
that the qualitative results still hold, with consequences only to the notation.
5 Conclusion
This paper presents a model of asymmetric information in which a mix of
output and land taxes arises as a means of implementing an optimal taxation
mechanism. The model is stripped down to highlight characteristics commonly
observed in Latin American countries. The role of each one in our main propo-
sitions is discussed in the last section.
The mechanics of our results is the following. The absence of a land rental
market restrains the cultivated area to be not larger than the farm size. As a
consequence, depending on the proclivity of agricultural and non-agricultural
16 This functional form includes the cases in which the social planner combats idle
land, measured as T=A or T ￿ A.
16land use, farmers have one or two key decisions to make. Whenever the land-
rental market constraint is binding, the cultivated area is equal to the farm
size and there is only one relevant choice. On the other hand, if the land rental
market constraint is not binding (the case with idle land), farmers choose both
farm size and area under cultivation. While we need only one tax instrument in
the ￿rst case, the second case requires two. Therefore, output taxes have a key
role in the taxation of those farmers operating with idle land, even considering
their distortional e⁄ect.
The lack of a land rental market along with the inverse relationship between
farm size and productivity explains not only the evasion of land taxes but also
why this practice is more evident among large landholders. Small farmers do
not operate with idle land due to their higher agricultural productivity. Hence,
a land-tax scheme is more likely to be e⁄ective for them.
The present model can be useful for issues of land policy in Latin American
countries. Appropriate land taxes might correct land prices in economies where
they are above the discounted present value of agricultural in￿ ows, inducing
land redistribution from large landowners to more productive small peasants
[Deininger and Feder (2000)]. We have argued that the implementation of such
taxes comprises both land and output taxes.
Appendix
PROOF. [Proposition 2] Let (t;A;T) be an implementable allocation piece-
































































and, switching ￿ and ^ ￿, dividing by
￿
￿ ￿ ^ ￿
￿
and taking ^ ￿ ! ￿, the function ￿
is proved to be piecewise C1 and
d
d￿
￿(￿j￿) = Q￿ (A;￿) + ￿￿ (T;￿) a:s: for all ￿ 2 ￿:
Repeating this computation considering
￿
￿ ￿ ^ ￿
￿2
, we get
QA￿ (A;￿) _ A + ￿T￿ (T;￿) _ T ￿ 0 a:s: for all ￿ 2 ￿:￿
17PROOF. [Proposition 3] Notice that we need only to check the incentive
compatibility constraint for the mechanism determined by (4). From Proposi-
tion 2 and its proof, it is su¢ cient to test:

















for every x;y 2 ￿, where the equality results from (IC1) applied to the mech-
anism (t￿￿;A￿￿;T ￿￿), after some manipulation, and e A￿￿ = A￿￿(e ￿), etc. There-
fore, it is su¢ cient to check that the sign of the expression in the bracket
above is always non-negative. For this we separate the analysis in two cases:
For all ￿ 2 ￿C, we can di⁄erentiate (4) to obtain
_ A





under (A1), (A4), (A5) and (A6). In this case, the non-negativeness of the
expression in the bracket reduces to
h
QA￿( e A






which is clearly true under (A1) and (A6).












under (A1), (A4) and (A5). The sign of _ A￿￿ depends on QA￿. Using ￿, the




1 ￿ _ R
￿
￿AA( e A￿￿; e T ￿￿;￿)
+
￿
￿T￿( e T ￿￿;￿)
￿2 ￿
1 ￿ ￿ ￿ _ R
￿
￿TT( e A￿￿; e T ￿￿;￿)
￿ 0;
which is true under (A4) and (A5).￿
PROOF. [Proposition 4] Let Q = Q(A;￿) denote the agricultural produc-
tion. Since QA(A;￿) > 0, we can use the implicit function theorem to de￿ne
a function A = A(Q;￿). Therefore, we will de￿ne the tax schedule in terms
of (A;T) and the announcement b ￿ without loss of generality. This proof owes
much to La⁄ont and Tirole (1993). Consider a tax scheme t(A;T; b ￿) as in the
statement of the proposition (only substituting Q for A) in which, for every
18b ￿ 2 ~ ￿U,
￿(b ￿) = QA(A
￿￿(b ￿); b ￿) ￿ w;
￿(b ￿) = ￿T(T
￿￿(b ￿); b ￿) ￿ p;
￿(b ￿) = t
￿￿(b ￿) ￿ ￿(b ￿)A
￿￿(b ￿) ￿ ￿(b ￿)T
￿￿(b ￿);
and, for b ￿ 2 ~ ￿C,
￿(b ￿) = 0;
￿(b ￿) = QA(A
￿￿(b ￿); b ￿) + ￿T(T
￿￿(b ￿); b ￿) ￿ p ￿ w;
￿(b ￿) = t
￿￿(b ￿) ￿ ￿(b ￿)T
￿￿(b ￿);
where (A￿￿;T ￿￿;t￿￿) is the second best solution.
Given this linear tax scheme, a type ￿ farmer chooses agricultural production
and farm size in order to solve:
max
A;T;^ ￿
Q(A;￿) + ￿(T;￿) ￿ wA ￿ pT ￿ t(A;T; b ￿) (9)
s.t. A ￿ T:
The ￿rst-order condition gives:
QA(A;￿) ￿ w ￿ b ￿ ￿ ￿ = 0 (10a)

















b ￿ ￿ = 0 (10c)
where ￿ is the Lagrange multiplier of (RM￿). In order to facilitate notation,





















Using Proposition 3 and the de￿nition of ￿, ￿ and ￿, we can show that the
(10c) is equivalent to ￿
b ￿ ￿
￿






T ￿ b T
￿
= 0. From this, it is easy to
see that for each ￿ (either in ~ ￿U or ~ ￿C), A = A￿￿(b ￿), T = T ￿￿(b ￿) and b ￿ = ￿
satisfy the ￿rst-order condition of (P:SB). The following lemma shows that
this allocation is indeed the optimal for the program above and concludes the
proof.￿
Lemma (i) sign(




￿ < 0 and
b ￿
T > 0.
(ii) For given ￿ and b ￿, there exists only one (A;T) satisfying (10a) and (10b)
of the ￿rst-order condition above. Moreover, this (A;T) is the optimal for the
program (9) when we consider b ￿ ￿xed.
19(iii) For (A;T) given of (ii), b ￿ > ￿ if and only if ￿
b ￿ ￿
￿






T ￿ b T
￿
< 0.
In particular, b ￿ = ￿ is the optimal for the program (9).
PROOF. (i) Assumption (A7) determines that QA￿ does not change its sign
more than once. Let us start considering the case where QA￿ < 0. First suppose
that b ￿ 2 ~ ￿U. The ￿rst-order condition of the second-best problem is
b QA ￿ w ￿ b R b QA￿ = 0
(1 ￿ ￿)b ￿T ￿ p ￿ b Rb ￿T￿ = 0:





R ￿ 1) b QA￿






R ￿ (1 ￿ ￿)]b ￿T￿
(1 ￿ ￿)b ￿TT ￿ b Rb ￿TT￿
> 0
by assumptions A4 to A7. Thus, using the de￿nition of b ￿ and b ￿,
b ￿ ￿ = b QAA
b ￿




R b QA￿ > 0
b ￿
￿ = b ￿TT
b ￿








Notice that in the case where QA￿ > 0 we get
b ￿
A > 0 and
b ￿ ￿ < 0 and, therefore,
b ￿ ￿
b ￿
A < 0 whatever is the sign of QA￿.
If b ￿ 2 ￿C, we have
b ￿ ￿ = 0 and, analogously, the ￿rst-order condition of the
second-best problem gives
b QA + (1 ￿ ￿)b ￿T ￿ w ￿ p ￿ b R( b QA￿ + b ￿T￿) = 0:







R ￿ 1)( b QA￿ + b ￿T￿)
b QAA + (1 ￿ ￿)b ￿TT ￿ b R( b QAA￿ + b ￿TT￿)
￿ 0
by assumptions A4-A7. Thus, using the de￿nition of b ￿,
20b ￿
￿ =( b QAA + b ￿TT)
b ￿





b QA￿ + b ￿T￿
￿
+ b R( b QAA￿ + b ￿TT￿)
b ￿
T + ￿b ￿TT
b ￿
T < 0:
(ii) This is a direct consequence of the strict concavity (A4) and Inada￿ s con-
dition.
(iii) We will show that the announcement of ^ ￿ = ￿ is optimal for the program
without the condition A ￿ T. Then, we conclude using part (ii) that this fact
implies in unique choices of (A;T) which are equivalent to those of (P:SB),
with A ￿ T.
Fix b ￿ and consider QA￿ < 0. Let (A;T;￿) be the solution of the equations
(10a) and (10b) above for ￿ < b ￿, considering ￿ = 0 (relaxed program). By the
implicit function theorem, there are functions T = ￿(A) and ￿ = ￿(A) that






















T ￿ b T
￿
< 0
if and only if ￿ < b ￿, for (A;T;￿) solution of (10a) and (10b) (because for
￿ = b ￿, this is exactly zero, i.e., equation (10c)). Analogously, the same is true
for QA￿ > 0. Since part (ii) determines that the system (10a) and (10b) has
only one solution for each ￿ and ^ ￿, with A ￿ T, we are done.￿
PROOF. [Lemma 5] For constrained types ￿ 2 ~ ￿C, equation (6) establishes
that _ A￿￿ = _ T ￿￿ > 0 . For unconstrained types ￿ 2 ~ ￿U, it is straightforward to
check that (7) implies in _ A￿￿ < 0 under (A1), (A4) and (A8) and equation (8)
determines _ T ￿￿ > 0.
To complete the proof, it is su¢ cient to verify that the multiplier of the con-
straint A ￿ T is strictly decreasing in ￿. Di⁄erentiating (4a) for all ￿ 2 ￿C




1 ￿ _ R
￿
QA￿ + (QAA ￿ RQAA￿) _ A
￿￿ < 0;
under assumptions (A1), (A4), (A5) and (A8). Therefore, there exists at most
one critical type ~ ￿ such that ~ ￿U = (~ ￿;￿ ￿].￿
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